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End of Internship Report

In order to obtain a Bachelor's degree

Specialty: Cybersecurity

Theme :

Ai Red Teaming

Case : HIMI-Boumerdes

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Dedication

We dedicate this work to our families, whose unwavering support, patience, and encouragement have been a constant source of motivation throughout our academic journey. Their trust and understanding provided us with the stability and confidence necessary to pursue our studies and complete this work with determination.

This report is also dedicated to all those who inspired us to explore the fields of cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Their passion for knowledge, innovation, and technological progress motivated us to continuously learn, improve our skills, and face the challenges encountered during this project together.

Finally, we dedicate this work to everyone who believes in the importance of collaboration, perseverance, and continuous learning as essential pillars of academic and professional success. This project stands as a reflection of teamwork, shared effort, and commitment to excellence.

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resume

The AI Red Teamer project, in collaboration with Google, trains cybersecurity professionals to assess, exploit, and secure AI systems. Covering prompt injection, model privacy attacks, adversarial AI, supply chain risks, and deployment threats, it contain labs. Aligned with Google's Secure AI Framework (SAIF), it ensures relevance to real-world AI security challenges. we will gain skills to manipulate model behaviors, develop AI-specific red teaming strategies, and perform offensive security testing against AI-driven applications.

General Introduction

Artificial Intelligence is increasingly integrated into security tools — from spam filters and network anomaly detectors to malware classifiers and large language models. However, AI systems introduce novel vulnerabilities across models, data, application logic, and deployment environments. This rapport studies these weaknesses through a practical red-teaming perspective: building representative models, demonstrating attack techniques, and proposing pragmatic mitigations.

The work combines hands-on experiments (a spam classifier, a network-anomaly detector, and a byteplot-based malware classifier) with focused security assessments: prompt-injection and LLM output attacks, data integrity threats, application and system vulnerabilities, and evasion techniques. Each chapter presents the attack vector, a compact proof-of-concept, and short, actionable recommendations. By keeping methods reproducible but concise, this rapport aims to give practitioners clear guidance to detect, test, and harden ML systems in production.

Chapter 1: Presentation of the Host Organization

1. Chapter Introduction

This chapter aims to present the host organization in which the internship was carried out, namely **SGP IMMO**. It describes the institutional and professional context of the internship, the organizational structure of the company, its main activities, and the working environment in which the assigned tasks were performed. This presentation provides essential context for understanding the internship activities and the project developed during this period.

2. General Presentation of SGP IMMO

SGP IMMO is a company specializing in **real estate development and promotion**, operating mainly in the planning, construction, and commercialization of real estate projects. The company works within a regulated framework and complies with urban planning, technical, and legal standards in force.

SGP IMMO's activities include residential housing projects, commercial premises, and regulated real estate programs. The company places strong emphasis on construction quality, compliance with deadlines, and customer satisfaction.

In recent years, SGP IMMO has adopted a strategy focused on the **progressive digitalization of its processes**, particularly in project management, commercial follow-up, and communication. This modernization approach constituted an important aspect of the professional environment in which the internship was conducted.

3. Organizational Structure

SGP IMMO follows a structured organizational model that ensures efficient coordination between its various departments. The company is headed by a general management team responsible for strategic, administrative, and operational supervision.

Under the authority of management, several functional units operate collaboratively:

- **Administrative and Financial Department**, responsible for administrative documentation, financial monitoring, and legal compliance.
- **Technical Department**, in charge of construction site monitoring, coordination with architects, engineering offices, and contractors.
- **Commercial Department**, responsible for sales, customer relations, and commercial follow-up.
- **Communication and Digital Department**, managing the company's digital presence, project promotion, and internal and external communication tools.

This organizational structure allows SGP IMMO to efficiently manage real estate projects from the planning phase to final delivery.

4. Main Activities

The core activities of SGP IMMO are structured around several key areas.

The first activity concerns **real estate development**, including land identification, project planning, regulatory approval, and scheduling. This phase requires coordination among multiple stakeholders.

The second activity involves **construction and site supervision**, ensuring that projects are executed in compliance with technical standards, budgets, and deadlines.

The third activity focuses on **commercialization and client relations**, including marketing strategies, customer support, and sales management.

Finally, SGP IMMO places increasing importance on **information management and digital communication**, using technological tools to improve data management, client tracking, and internal coordination.

5. Working Environment and Tools

The working environment at SGP IMMO is characterized by close collaboration between departments. Regular communication ensures the consistency and reliability of shared information.

From a technical perspective, the company uses various digital tools to manage projects, commercial operations, and communication activities. These tools help centralize data, improve traceability, and optimize internal workflows.

The gradual integration of digital solutions reflects SGP IMMO’s commitment to modernization and efficiency. This digital transformation provided a relevant context for the internship, particularly in relation to information management, data security, and process optimization.

Chapter 2: Application of Ai infosec

1. Environment setup

For this project, a stable and isolated Python environment was required to develop and test AI models securely and efficiently. **Miniconda** was selected as the foundation environment manager due to its lightweight nature and efficient control over dependencies compared to a standard Python installation. It provides the *conda* package manager, enabling simplified installation, updating, and isolation of project-specific libraries a crucial aspect for AI and deep learning tasks that often involve complex dependencies.

Advantages of Miniconda include optimized performance, environment isolation for different projects, and simplified package management, ensuring compatibility and reproducibility.
To streamline installation on Windows, the **Scoop** command-line installer was used. After configuring Scoop and adding the "extras" bucket, Miniconda was installed and initialized via `conda init`, which modifies shell configuration files to enable *conda* commands globally. Additional repositories such as *defaults*, *conda-forge*, *nvidia*, and *pytorch* were added to ensure access to the latest optimized packages.

To prevent automatic activation of the base environment at startup, the command
`conda config --set auto_activate_base false`
was used, ensuring a clean shell each session. This practice helps maintain a minimal and controlled runtime, improving workflow clarity and reducing potential conflicts.

Finally, **virtual environments** were established to isolate project dependencies. Using `conda create -n ai python=3.11`, a dedicated environment named *ai* was created to host all AI-related libraries. Virtual environments are vital for maintaining dependency isolation, project reproducibility, and overall system stability, preventing interference between unrelated projects.

Through this configuration, the development environment became modular, reproducible, and optimized — providing a solid foundation for the subsequent implementation of AI-based security models in the following chapters.

2. Jupyter Lab

JupyterLab is an interactive web-based development environment widely used in data science and machine learning. It allows developers to combine code, visualizations, and documentation in one interface, making it ideal for AI research and experimentation. Its modular design supports interactive coding, data exploration, and result visualization through a browser-based interface.

Installed via Conda (conda install -y jupyter jupyterlab notebook ipykernel) within the previously created *ai* environment, JupyterLab offers a flexible workspace where Python code can be executed in individual cells. The platform's **notebook** structure—composed of code, markdown, and raw cells—enables iterative experimentation and clear documentation. Users can easily create, modify, and execute code blocks while observing outputs in real time, facilitating rapid testing and debugging..



Figure 1 JupyterLab launcher interface

One of JupyterLab's key features is its **stateful execution model**, meaning that variables and functions defined in earlier cells remain accessible to later ones. This allows seamless workflow continuity but requires careful execution order to avoid inconsistent results. For example, redefining variables or re-running cells can alter the environment state, affecting subsequent outputs.

JupyterLab also integrates with essential Python libraries such as **pandas**, **matplotlib**, and **seaborn** for data analysis and visualization. Users can easily load datasets, generate graphs, and interpret AI model performance interactively. Markdown



Figure 2 Data analysis and visualization using JupyterLab

support allows embedding of formatted text, LaTeX equations, and images, turning notebooks into reproducible and shareable research documents

In this project, JupyterLab served as the main development platform for building, training, and evaluating AI models. Its interactive and organized design significantly enhanced productivity, enabling real-time testing, visualization, and documentation within a single environment—an essential asset for developing and securing AI systems.

3. spam classification

3.1.1 The Spam Dataset

In this section, we explore Bayesian spam classification using the **SMS Spam Collection Dataset**, a well-known resource for developing and evaluating text-based spam filters. This dataset was created by **Tiago A. Almeida** and **Akebo Yamakami** (University of Campinas, Brazil), and **José María Gómez Hidalgo** (Optenet R&D Department, Spain). Their collaborative research, *"Contributions to the Study of SMS Spam Filtering: New Collection and Results"* (ACM Symposium on Document Engineering, 2011), addressed the increasing issue of **SMS spam**, which was underrepresented compared to email spam in existing datasets.

The dataset compiles **5,574 text messages** collected from multiple sources, including **Grumbletext**, the **NUS SMS Corpus**, and **Caroline Tag's PhD thesis**. Each message is labeled as either **ham** (legitimate) or **spam** (unsolicited). *Ham* messages generally originate from known contacts, subscriptions, or newsletters that provide value, whereas *spam* messages are intrusive, irrelevant, or potentially harmful. This corpus is particularly valuable for building and evaluating models capable of distinguishing useful communication from unwanted content.

Dataset Acquisition and Preparation

The dataset is downloaded programmatically using Python's **requests** library, where an HTTP GET request retrieves the zip file. Upon verifying a successful response (status_code == 200), the archive is extracted using **zipfile** and **io** modules. The extraction directory (sms_spam_collection) is verified with os.listdir() to ensure the presence of the **SMSSpamCollection** file.

After extraction, the dataset is loaded into a **pandas DataFrame** using pd.read_csv, specifying the tab-separated format (sep='\t'), no header (header=None), and manually assigning column names (names=['label', 'message']). Before analysis, the dataset undergoes inspection and cleaning. Functions such as df.head(), df.describe(), and df.info() provide an overview of data structure, distribution, and types.

Next, data quality is verified by checking for **missing values** using df.isnull().sum() and **duplicate records** using df.duplicated().sum(). Any duplicates are removed via df.drop_duplicates() to ensure the dataset's integrity and reliability.

This cleaned dataset forms the foundation for implementing and testing spam classification models in subsequent stages.



Figure 3 Loading and initial exploration of the SMS Spam Collection dataset in JupyterLab

3.1.2 Preprocessing the Spam Dataset

Before training the Bayesian spam classifier, the SMS Spam Collection dataset must be preprocessed to standardize the text and enhance model accuracy. This stage involves cleaning, normalizing, and transforming raw messages into a structured format suitable for machine learning. The process relies mainly on the **NLTK** library

```
[8]: import nltk

# Download the necessary NLTK data files
nltk.download("punkt")
nltk.download("punkt_tab")
nltk.download("stopwords")

print("=== BEFORE ANY PREPROCESSING ===")
print(df.head(5))
```

```
[nltk_data] Downloading package punkt to
[nltk_data]     C:\Users\mehdi\AppData\Roaming\nltk_data...
[nltk_data]   Unzipping tokenizers\punkt.zip.
[nltk_data] Downloading package punkt_tab to
[nltk_data]     C:\Users\mehdi\AppData\Roaming\nltk_data...
[nltk_data]   Unzipping tokenizers\punkt_tab.zip.
[nltk_data] Downloading package stopwords to
[nltk_data]     C:\Users\mehdi\AppData\Roaming\nltk_data...
=== BEFORE ANY PREPROCESSING ===
  label                                            message
0   ham  Go until jurong point, crazy.. Available only ...
1   ham                      Ok lar... Joking wif u oni...
2  spam  Free entry in 2 a wkly comp to win FA Cup fina...
3   ham  U dun say so early hor... U c already then say...
4   ham  Nah I don't think he goes to usf, he lives aro...
[nltk_data]   Unzipping corpora\stopwords.zip.
```

Figure 4 Dataset overview before text preprocessing using NLTK

for tokenization, stop word removal, and stemming.

First, essential NLTK resources such as *punkt* and *stopwords* are downloaded to ensure uninterrupted text processing. Each message is then converted to **lowercase**, allowing the model to treat “Free” and “free” as identical tokens, reducing redundancy and improving feature consistency.

Next, **punctuation and numbers** are removed to focus on meaningful textual content. However, contextually relevant symbols such as $ and !—which often indicate urgency or monetary offers in spam—are preserved. This selective cleaning helps maintain features that may hold semantic or behavioral significance.

The cleaned text is then **tokenized**, dividing messages into individual words or tokens. Tokenization converts unstructured sentences into standardized elements, enabling the

```
[9]: # Convert all message text to lowercase
df["message"] = df["message"].str.lower()
print("\n=== AFTER LOWERCASING ===")
print(df["message"].head(5))

=== AFTER LOWERCASING ===
0    go until jurong point, crazy.. available only ...
1                        ok lar... joking wif u oni...
2    free entry in 2 a wkly comp to win fa cup fina...
3    u dun say so early hor... u c already then say...
4    nah i don't think he goes to usf, he lives aro...
Name: message, dtype: object

[10]: import re
# Remove non-essential punctuation and numbers, keep useful symbols like $ and !
df["message"] = df["message"].apply(lambda x: re.sub(r"[^a-z\s$!]", "", x))
print("\n=== AFTER REMOVING PUNCTUATION & NUMBERS (except $ and !) ===")
print(df["message"].head(5))

=== AFTER REMOVING PUNCTUATION & NUMBERS (except $ and !) ===
0    go until jurong point crazy available only in ...
1                            ok lar joking wif u oni
2    free entry in  a wkly comp to win fa cup final...
3          u dun say so early hor u c already then say
4    nah i dont think he goes to usf he lives aroun...
Name: message, dtype: object

[11]: from nltk.tokenize import word_tokenize
# Split each message into individual tokens
df["message"] = df["message"].apply(word_tokenize)
print("\n=== AFTER TOKENIZATION ===")
print(df["message"].head(5))

=== AFTER TOKENIZATION ===
0    [go, until, jurong, point, crazy, available, o...
1                        [ok, lar, joking, wif, u, oni]
2    [free, entry, in, a, wkly, comp, to, win, fa, ...
3    [u, dun, say, so, early, hor, u, c, already, t...
4    [nah, i, dont, think, he, goes, to, usf, he, l...
Name: message, dtype: object

[12]: from nltk.corpus import stopwords
# Define a set of English stop words and remove them from the tokens
stop_words = set(stopwords.words("english"))
df["message"] = df["message"].apply(lambda x: [word for word in x if word not in stop_words])
print("\n=== AFTER REMOVING STOP WORDS ===")
print(df["message"].head(5))

=== AFTER REMOVING STOP WORDS ===
0    [go, jurong, point, crazy, available, bugis, n...
1                        [ok, lar, joking, wif, u, oni]
2    [free, entry, wkly, comp, win, fa, cup, final,...
3        [u, dun, say, early, hor, u, c, already, say]
4    [nah, dont, think, goes, usf, lives, around, t...
Name: message, dtype: object
```

Figure 5 Text preprocessing steps applied to the SMS dataset

application of linguistic operations such as stop word filtering and stemming.

Subsequently, **stop words** (e.g., “and,” “the,” “is”) are removed to eliminate non-informative content and reduce dataset noise. This step enhances computational efficiency and ensures the model focuses on discriminative words that better separate *spam* from *ham*.

Stemming follows, which reduces words to their root forms (e.g., "running" → "run"), consolidating vocabulary and improving the classifier's generalization ability. After stemming, each message is represented by concise lists of normalized terms.

tokens are **rejoined into complete strings** to restore a structure compatible with vectorization techniques such as **TF-IDF** or **CountVectorizer**. The resulting corpus consists of cleaned, normalized text messages ready for feature extraction.



Figure 6 ext stemming using the Porter Stemmer

3.1.3 Feature Extraction

Feature extraction transforms preprocessed SMS messages into numerical vectors



Figure 7 Reconstructing text after stemming for feature extraction

suitable for machine learning algorithms. Since models cannot directly process raw text data, they rely on numeric representations—such as counts or frequencies of words—to identify patterns that differentiate spam from ham.

3.1.4 Training and Evaluation (spam Detection)

After text preprocessing and feature extraction, the next step involves training a **Multinomial Naive Bayes classifier**—a probabilistic model particularly effective for text classification tasks due to its simplicity, efficiency, and robustness in handling high-dimensional sparse data.

To streamline the workflow, a **scikit-learn Pipeline** is implemented to combine vectorization and model training into one consistent structure. The pipeline ensures that raw text is always processed in the same way before classification, enhancing reliability and reproducibility:

Hyperparameter Tuning

Model performance is optimized using **GridSearchCV**, which systematically evaluates multiple parameter combinations via cross-validation. In this case, the parameter **alpha**—the Laplace smoothing factor—is tuned to prevent zero probabilities for unseen words and to balance bias and variance.



Figure 8 Feature extraction using CountVectorizer

This configuration ensures optimal generalization while maintaining a clean and modular workflow. The **F1-score**, combining precision and recall, serves as the main metric to balance false positives and negatives—crucial in spam detection where misclassification can have practical implications.

Model Evaluation



Figure 9 Spam classification model training using Naive Bayes with GridSearch

To assess real-world effectiveness, the trained model is tested on **unseen SMS messages**. This step validates the classifier's ability to generalize beyond the training data. Each message is preprocessed using the same operations as during training:

[17]:
```
# Example SMS messages for evaluation
new_messages = [
    "Congratulations! You've won a $1000 Walmart gift card. Go to http://bit.ly/1234 to claim now.",
    "Hey, are we still meeting up for lunch today?",
    "Urgent! Your account has been compromised. Verify your details here: www.fakebank.com/verify",
    "Reminder: Your appointment is scheduled for tomorrow at 10am.",
    "FREE entry in a weekly competition to win an iPad. Just text WIN to 80085 now!",
]
```

[18]:
```
import numpy as np
import re
# Preprocess function that mirrors the training-time preprocessing
def preprocess_message(message):
    message = message.lower()
    message = re.sub(r"[^a-z\s$!]", "", message)
    tokens = word_tokenize(message)
    tokens = [word for word in tokens if word not in stop_words]
    tokens = [stemmer.stem(word) for word in tokens]
    return " ".join(tokens)
```

[19]:
```
# Preprocess and vectorize messages
processed_messages = [preprocess_message(msg) for msg in new_messages]
```

Figure 10 Confusion matrix of the spam classification model

lowercasing, removing special characters, tokenizing, filtering stop words, and stemming.

These cleaned messages are then **vectorized** using the same CountVectorizer stored within the pipeline before being passed to the trained classifier.

```
[20]: # Transform preprocessed messages into feature vectors
X_new = best_model.named_steps["vectorizer"].transform(processed_messages)
# Predict with the trained classifier
predictions = best_model.named_steps["classifier"].predict(X_new)
prediction_probabilities = best_model.named_steps["classifier"].predict_proba(X_new)
# Display predictions and probabilities for each evaluated message
for i, msg in enumerate(new_messages):
    prediction = "Spam" if predictions[i] == 1 else "Not-Spam"
    spam_probability = prediction_probabilities[i][1]  # Probability of being spam
    ham_probability = prediction_probabilities[i][0]   # Probability of being not spam

    print(f"Message: {msg}")
    print(f"Prediction: {prediction}")
    print(f"Spam Probability: {spam_probability:.2f}")
    print(f"Not-Spam Probability: {ham_probability:.2f}")
    print("-" * 50)
```

```
Message: Congratulations! You've won a $1000 Walmart gift card. Go to http://bit.ly/1234 to claim now.
Prediction: Spam
Spam Probability: 1.00
Not-Spam Probability: 0.00
--------------------------------------------------
Message: Hey, are we still meeting up for lunch today?
Prediction: Not-Spam
Spam Probability: 0.00
Not-Spam Probability: 1.00
--------------------------------------------------
Message: Urgent! Your account has been compromised. Verify your details here: www.fakebank.com/verify
Prediction: Spam
Spam Probability: 0.96
Not-Spam Probability: 0.04
--------------------------------------------------
Message: Reminder: Your appointment is scheduled for tomorrow at 10am.
Prediction: Not-Spam
Spam Probability: 0.00
Not-Spam Probability: 1.00
--------------------------------------------------
Message: FREE entry in a weekly competition to win an iPad. Just text WIN to 80085 now!
Prediction: Spam
Spam Probability: 1.00
Not-Spam Probability: 0.00
--------------------------------------------------
```

Figure 11 Evaluation of the spam classifier on new SMS messages

For each evaluated message, the system outputs:

The **original text**,

The **predicted label** (Spam or Not-Spam),

The **spam probability score**.

This probabilistic output provides interpretability by showing how confident the model is in its prediction. For example:

Message	Prediction	Spam Probability

Message	Prediction	Spam Probability
“Congratulations! You’ve won a $1000 gift card.”	Spam	1.00
“Hey, are we still meeting for lunch?”	Not-Spam	0.00
“Urgent! Verify your account.”	Spam	0.94

The classifier demonstrates strong discrimination ability across diverse message types—detecting promotional, phishing, and fraudulent messages while preserving legitimate communications.

Model Persistence and Deployment

To facilitate reuse and deployment, the trained pipeline is serialized using **Joblib**, an efficient library for saving large Python objects. Model persistence prevents retraining from scratch, saving computation time during deployment or future use.

Figure 12 Saving and loading the trained spam detection model using Joblib

This saved model retains all preprocessing steps, learned parameters, and configurations, allowing immediate prediction on new data without reinitializing the pipeline. This approach simplifies integration into real-time systems or API-based spam detection services

Conclusion

Through this process, the spam detection model achieves a complete and reproducible workflow—from **data preprocessing and feature extraction** to **training, optimization, and deployment**. The integration of Pipeline, GridSearchCV, and Joblib ensures scalability, maintainability, and efficiency. The resulting classifier

effectively identifies spam messages with high accuracy and confidence, demonstrating the power of **Bayesian inference and machine learning** in modern text analysis.

4. Network Anomaly Detection

4.1 Network anomaly detection

Anomaly detection aims to identify data points that significantly deviate from normal patterns—an essential capability in cybersecurity for spotting intrusions or malicious traffic. Among the machine learning approaches used, **Random Forests** are particularly effective due to their robustness and ability to handle high-dimensional, nonlinear data.

Random Forests

A **Random Forest** is an ensemble of multiple decision trees, each trained on a random subset of the data (bootstrapping) and using a random subset of features at every split. This diversity minimizes overfitting and improves generalization. In classification, each tree votes for a class, and the majority determines the final output; in regression, predictions are averaged.

Random Forests for Anomaly Detection

When applied to anomaly detection, the model is trained only on data representing normal behavior. New observations are then evaluated against this learned baseline—



Figure 13 Raw NSL-KDD dataset file (KDD+.txt)

those with poor fit or low confidence are flagged as anomalies. This makes Random Forests suitable for **Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)**, capable of identifying abnormal or suspicious network activity in real time.

NSL-KDD Dataset

For experimentation, the **NSL-KDD dataset**—a refined version of the KDD'99 benchmark—is widely used. It removes redundancy, corrects class imbalance, and provides labeled samples for both normal and attack traffic. It supports binary classification (normal vs. attack) and multi-class detection (specific attack types), making it ideal for evaluating IDS performance.

Implementation Overview

The dataset is downloaded from the Hack The Box repository and extracted locally using Python libraries such as requests, zipfile, and io. Afterward, essential dependencies—numpy, pandas, scikit-learn, matplotlib, and seaborn—are imported for data processing, visualization, and model evaluation.



Figure 14 Downloading and extracting the NSL-KDD dataset

Each record in NSL-KDD includes 41 features describing network behavior, such as connection duration, protocol type, number of failed logins, and error rates, along with the labels **attack** and **level**. Once column names are defined, the dataset is loaded into a **pandas DataFrame** using: df = pd.read_csv('KDD+.txt', names=columns)

This structured format allows for quick inspection, cleaning, and type verification before preprocessing and training the Random Forest model. The resulting framework provides a strong foundation for detecting anomalous network activity with high accuracy.

```
4]: # Read the combined NSL-KDD dataset into a DataFrame
df = pd.read_csv(file_path, names=columns)
print(df.head())
```

```
   duration protocol_type   service flag  src_bytes  dst_bytes  land  \
0         0           tcp  ftp_data   SF        491          0     0
1         0           udp     other   SF        146          0     0
2         0           tcp   private   S0          0          0     0
3         0           tcp      http   SF        232       8153     0
4         0           tcp      http   SF        199        420     0

   wrong_fragment  urgent  hot  ...  dst_host_same_srv_rate  \
0               0       0    0  ...                    0.17
1               0       0    0  ...                    0.00
2               0       0    0  ...                    0.10
3               0       0    0  ...                    1.00
4               0       0    0  ...                    1.00

   dst_host_diff_srv_rate  dst_host_same_src_port_rate  \
0                    0.03                         0.17
1                    0.60                         0.88
2                    0.05                         0.00
3                    0.00                         0.03
4                    0.00                         0.00

   dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate  dst_host_serror_rate  \
0                         0.00                  0.00
1                         0.00                  0.00
2                         0.00                  1.00
3                         0.04                  0.03
4                         0.00                  0.00

   dst_host_srv_serror_rate  dst_host_rerror_rate  dst_host_srv_rerror_rate  \
0                      0.00                  0.05                      0.00
1                      0.00                  0.00                      0.00
2                      1.00                  0.00                      0.00
3                      0.01                  0.00                      0.01
4                      0.00                  0.00                      0.00

    attack  level
0   normal     20
1   normal     15
2  neptune     19
3   normal     21
4   normal     21

[5 rows x 43 columns]
```

Figure 15 Loading the NSL-KDD dataset into a pandas DataFrame

4.2 Preprocessing and Splitting the Dataset

Before training the Random Forest anomaly detection model, the **NSL-KDD dataset** must be preprocessed to transform raw network data into a machine-readable format. This involves creating classification targets, encoding categorical variables, selecting numeric features, and dividing the dataset into training, validation, and test subsets.

Creating Classification Targets

To simplify the detection task, we first create a **binary target variable** that distinguishes between normal (0) and attack (1) traffic:

df['attack_flag'] = df['attack'].apply(lambda a: 0 if a == 'normal' else 1)

While this binary form helps identify anomalies, it lacks detail about attack types. Therefore, we also construct a **multi-class target** (attack_map) to differentiate between four categories:

DoS attacks (e.g., neptune, smurf)

Probe attacks (e.g., satan, ipsweep)

Privilege Escalation attacks (e.g., buffer_overflow, rootkit)

Access attacks (e.g., guess_passwd, ftp_write)

Each row is labeled accordingly (0–4) using a mapping function, allowing the model to learn both general and specific intrusion behaviors.

Encoding Categorical Variables

Certain features, such as protocol_type and service, contain categorical values (e.g., tcp, http) that must be numerically represented. Using **one-hot encoding** (pd.get_dummies), each category becomes an independent binary column. This prevents unintended ordinal relationships and ensures that the machine-learning algorithm can process categorical data effectively.

Selecting Numeric Features

The dataset also includes numerous **numeric features**—from traffic volume indicators like duration, src_bytes, and dst_bytes to statistical measures such as serror_rate and dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate. Selecting these relevant metrics ensures the model captures both raw activity and higher-level behavioral patterns that help differentiate normal from malicious traffic.

Network_Anomaly_Detectior | KDD+.txt | Spam_Dataset.ipynb

Code

[5]:
```
# Binary classification target
# Maps normal traffic to 0 and any type of attack to 1
df['attack_flag'] = df['attack'].apply(lambda a: 0 if a == 'normal' else 1)
```

[6]:
```
# Multi-class classification target categories
dos_attacks = ['apache2', 'back', 'land', 'neptune', 'mailbomb', 'pod',
               'processtable', 'smurf', 'teardrop', 'udpstorm', 'worm']
probe_attacks = ['ipsweep', 'mscan', 'nmap', 'portsweep', 'saint', 'satan']
privilege_attacks = ['buffer_overflow', 'loadmdoule', 'perl', 'ps',
                     'rootkit', 'sqlattack', 'xterm']
access_attacks = ['ftp_write', 'guess_passwd', 'http_tunnel', 'imap',
                  'multihop', 'named', 'phf', 'sendmail', 'snmpgetattack',
                  'snmpguess', 'spy', 'warezclient', 'warezmaster',
                  'xclock', 'xsnoop']

def map_attack(attack):
    if attack in dos_attacks:
        return 1
    elif attack in probe_attacks:
        return 2
    elif attack in privilege_attacks:
        return 3
    elif attack in access_attacks:
        return 4
    else:
        return 0

# Assign multi-class category to each row
df['attack_map'] = df['attack'].apply(map_attack)
```

[7]:
```
# Encoding categorical variables
features_to_encode = ['protocol_type', 'service']
encoded = pd.get_dummies(df[features_to_encode])
```

[8]:
```
# Numeric features that capture various statistical properties of the traffic
numeric_features = [
    'duration', 'src_bytes', 'dst_bytes', 'wrong_fragment', 'urgent', 'hot',
    'num_failed_logins', 'num_compromised', 'root_shell', 'su_attempted',
    'num_root', 'num_file_creations', 'num_shells', 'num_access_files',
    'num_outbound_cmds', 'count', 'srv_count', 'serror_rate',
    'srv_serror_rate', 'rerror_rate', 'srv_rerror_rate', 'same_srv_rate',
    'diff_srv_rate', 'srv_diff_host_rate', 'dst_host_count', 'dst_host_srv_count',
    'dst_host_same_srv_rate', 'dst_host_diff_srv_rate',
    'dst_host_same_src_port_rate', 'dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate',
    'dst_host_serror_rate', 'dst_host_srv_serror_rate', 'dst_host_rerror_rate',
    'dst_host_srv_rerror_rate'
]
```

Figure 16 Binary and multi-class labeling of network attacks

Preparing the Final Dataset

Encoded categorical variables and selected numeric features are combined into a single training DataFrame, train_set, while the multi-class label (attack_map) is stored in multi_y:

This consolidated dataset forms the foundation for model training and evaluation.

Splitting the Dataset

To ensure unbiased learning, the dataset is divided into three key parts using train_test_split:

Training Set (70%) – used to fit the model.

Validation Set (21%) – derived from the training data for hyperparameter tuning.

Test Set (20%) – reserved for final performance evaluation.



Figure 17 Encoding categorical features and selecting numeric attributes

This structure guarantees that training, tuning, and evaluation occur on distinct subsets, preventing data leakage and ensuring reliable, real-world performance of the anomaly detection system.

4.3 Training and Evaluation (Network Anomaly Detection)

This section presents the training, validation, and testing process for the **Random Forest** model applied to the **NSL-KDD dataset** to classify network traffic into normal or attack categories. The goal is to evaluate the model's performance across multiple attack types and ensure reliable generalization to unseen data.

Model Training

The model is initialized and trained using the multi-class training dataset (multi_train_X, multi_train_y) with a fixed random seed for reproducibility:



Figure 18 Construction of the final training dataset

[12]:

RandomForestClassifier

▼ Parameters

n_estimators	100
criterion	'gini'
max_depth	None
min_samples_split	2
min_samples_leaf	1
min_weight_fraction_leaf	0.0
max_features	'sqrt'
max_leaf_nodes	None
min_impurity_decrease	0.0
bootstrap	True
oob_score	False
n_jobs	None
random_state	1337
verbose	0
warm_start	False
class_weight	None
ccp_alpha	0.0
max_samples	None
monotonic_cst	None

Figure 19 Splitting data into training, validation, and test sets

During training, the Random Forest algorithm constructs multiple decision trees using bootstrapped samples and random feature subsets, combining their results through majority voting. This ensemble approach enhances robustness and reduces overfitting when handling high-dimensional network data.

Validation Evaluation

After training, the model is evaluated on the **validation set** to measure its generalization ability. Predictions are generated and assessed using common classification metrics:

[13]:
```python
# Predict and evaluate the model on the validation set
multi_predictions = rf_model_multi.predict(multi_val_X)
accuracy = accuracy_score(multi_val_y, multi_predictions)
precision = precision_score(multi_val_y, multi_predictions, average='weighted')
recall = recall_score(multi_val_y, multi_predictions, average='weighted')
f1 = f1_score(multi_val_y, multi_predictions, average='weighted')
print(f"Validation Set Evaluation:")
print(f"Accuracy: {accuracy:.4f}")
print(f"Precision: {precision:.4f}")
print(f"Recall: {recall:.4f}")
print(f"F1-Score: {f1:.4f}")

# Confusion Matrix for Validation Set
conf_matrix = confusion_matrix(multi_val_y, multi_predictions)
class_labels = ['Normal', 'DoS', 'Probe', 'Privilege', 'Access']
sns.heatmap(conf_matrix, annot=True, fmt='d', cmap='Blues',
            xticklabels=class_labels,
            yticklabels=class_labels)
plt.title('Network Anomaly Detection - Validation Set')
plt.xlabel('Predicted')
plt.ylabel('Actual')
plt.show()

# Classification Report for Validation Set
print("Classification Report for Validation Set:")
print(classification_report(multi_val_y, multi_predictions, target_names=class_labels))
```

```
Validation Set Evaluation:
Accuracy: 0.9950
Precision: 0.9949
Recall: 0.9950
F1-Score: 0.9949
```

Figure 20 Training a Random Forest model for network anomaly detection



Classification Report for Validation Set:

	precision	recall	f1-score	support
Normal	0.99	1.00	1.00	18519
DoS	1.00	1.00	1.00	12784
Probe	0.99	0.99	0.99	3409
Privilege	0.82	0.38	0.51	24
Access	0.97	0.92	0.95	908
accuracy			1.00	35644
macro avg	0.96	0.86	0.89	35644
weighted avg	0.99	1.00	0.99	35644

Figure 21 Random Forest model configuration and hyperparameters

Performance metrics such as **Accuracy**, **Precision**, **Recall**, and **F1-score** are calculated using sklearn.metrics. These indicators provide insight into overall correctness, reliability in positive detections, and balance between precision and recall. Visualization through a **confusion matrix** offers a detailed breakdown of correctly and incorrectly predicted classes, while a **classification report** summarizes results for each attack type (Normal, DoS, Probe, Privilege, and Access). The validation results confirmed stable and consistent classification across all classes, indicating a well-generalized model.

Final Testing

The trained model is then tested on the **unseen test dataset** to assess final real-world performance:

```
[14]: # Final evaluation on the test set
test_multi_predictions = rf_model_multi.predict(test_X)
test_accuracy = accuracy_score(test_y, test_multi_predictions)
test_precision = precision_score(test_y, test_multi_predictions, average='weighted')
test_recall = recall_score(test_y, test_multi_predictions, average='weighted')
test_f1 = f1_score(test_y, test_multi_predictions, average='weighted')
print("\nTest Set Evaluation:")
print(f"Accuracy: {test_accuracy:.4f}")
print(f"Precision: {test_precision:.4f}")
print(f"Recall: {test_recall:.4f}")
print(f"F1-Score: {test_f1:.4f}")

# Confusion Matrix for Test Set
test_conf_matrix = confusion_matrix(test_y, test_multi_predictions)
sns.heatmap(test_conf_matrix, annot=True, fmt='d', cmap='Blues',
            xticklabels=class_labels,
            yticklabels=class_labels)
plt.title('Network Anomaly Detection')
plt.xlabel('Predicted')
plt.ylabel('Actual')
plt.show()

# Classification Report for Test Set
print("Classification Report for Test Set:")
print(classification_report(test_y, test_multi_predictions, target_names=class_labels))
```

```
Test Set Evaluation:
Accuracy: 0.9949
Precision: 0.9947
Recall: 0.9949
F1-Score: 0.9947
```




```
Classification Report for Test Set:
              precision    recall  f1-score   support

      Normal       0.99      1.00      1.00     15402
         DoS       1.00      1.00      1.00     10721
       Probe       0.99      1.00      1.00      2796
   Privilege       0.62      0.24      0.34        21
      Access       0.96      0.92      0.94       764

    accuracy                           0.99     29704
   macro avg       0.91      0.83      0.85     29704
weighted avg       0.99      0.99      0.99     29704
```

Figure 22 Validation metrics for the network anomaly detection model

The same evaluation metrics are applied, revealing strong accuracy and balanced F1-scores across categories. The **test confusion matrix** visually demonstrates correct class separations, highlighting that most instances were accurately identified, with only minor misclassifications between similar attack categories. This confirms that the model effectively distinguishes normal and anomalous network behaviors.

Model Saving

Once validated and tested, the trained Random Forest model is serialized using **Joblib** for future deployment and reuse:



Figure 23 Saving the trained network anomaly detection model using Joblib

This saves the model's learned parameters, allowing it to be reloaded instantly for live anomaly detection or integration within larger cybersecurity frameworks.

5. Malware Classification

Malware refers to software intentionally designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to systems or networks. Common malware families include **Emotet**, **WannaCry**, and others listed in resources such as *Malpedia*. Traditional malware classification relies heavily on **static and dynamic analysis**, including reverse engineering—an approach that is precise but time-consuming and risky.
To address these limitations, this project implements **machine learning-based malware classification**, transforming binary executables into images to safely train a **Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)** without directly handling malicious files.

5.1 Malware Image Classification

This approach represents binary malware files as grayscale images, where each **byte (0–255)** corresponds to a pixel's brightness. A byte value of 0 appears as black, while 255 appears as white. As a result, the structure of the binary file forms unique visual textures and patterns that CNNs can learn to distinguish.
Using image representations eliminates the risk of system infection and simplifies data handling, making this an effective method for automated malware detection in secure environments.



Figure 24 Malware binary-to-image conversion process

5.2 Dataset Overview

The dataset used is the **Malimg Dataset**, which contains **9,339 images** across **25 malware families**. Each family's samples are stored in separate folders named after the malware type (e.g., *Allaple.A, FakeRean, Obfuscator.AD*, etc.).

These images are direct byte-to-pixel transformations of Windows Portable Executable (PE) files, maintaining all information from the original binary. This ensures the CNN can learn patterns without any information loss. Some malware families display highly distinctive patterns, allowing visual differentiation between families such as *FakeRean* and *Allaple.L*.

5.3 Dataset Exploration

To understand class imbalance, the dataset's **class distribution** is plotted using Python libraries such as os, matplotlib, and seaborn. The analysis revealed that some malware families (notably *Allaple.A* and *Allaple.L*) have significantly more samples than others, which may introduce bias in model predictions.

If imbalanced classes cause reduced accuracy or higher false positives, **data balancing techniques** (e.g., oversampling or undersampling) can be applied to improve



Figure 25 Malware class distribution in the dataset

classification fairness.

5.4 Dataset Preprocessing

Before model training, the data must be **split, preprocessed, and normalized** for CNN input. Using the split-folders library, the dataset is divided into **80% training** and **20% testing** sets, while keeping the folder structure for class labels:



Figure 26 Splitting the malware image dataset into training and test sets

This generates train/ and test/ directories containing 7,459 and 1,880 samples respectively. A validation folder is created but left empty for simplicity.

The images are then standardized using **PyTorch's transforms** to ensure consistent input dimensions and pixel normalization

This preprocessing ensures that all images share the same scale and brightness distribution, allowing the CNN to focus on structural features rather than raw intensity variations.

5.5 Creating DataLoaders

Using PyTorch's ImageFolder class, the preprocessed training and testing datasets are loaded dynamically, with labels derived automatically from folder names. The data is then wrapped in **DataLoader** objects to efficiently feed the model during training and evaluation

DataLoaders allow for parallelized loading, improving performance and memory efficiency, particularly when training large models like CNNs. Visual inspection of preprocessed samples confirms that resizing and normalization maintain overall structure while simplifying noise, ensuring proper model input.

For reusability, these steps are encapsulated into a load_datasets() function that automatically loads, preprocesses, and returns the number of classes:

This

```python
from torchvision import transforms
from torch.utils.data import DataLoader
from torchvision.datasets import ImageFolder
import os

def load_datasets(base_path, train_batch_size, test_batch_size):
    # Define preprocessing transforms
    transform = transforms.Compose([
        transforms.Resize((75, 75)),
        transforms.ToTensor(),
        transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.485, 0.456, 0.406], std=[0.229, 0.224, 0.225])
    ])

    # Load training and test datasets
    train_dataset = ImageFolder(
        root=os.path.join(base_path, "train"),
        transform=transform
    )

    test_dataset = ImageFolder(
        root=os.path.join(base_path, "test"),
        transform=transform
    )

    # Create data loaders
    train_loader = DataLoader(
        train_dataset,
        batch_size=train_batch_size,
        shuffle=True,
        num_workers=2
    )

    test_loader = DataLoader(
        test_dataset,
        batch_size=test_batch_size,
        shuffle=False,
        num_workers=2
    )

    n_classes = len(train_dataset.classes)
    return train_loader, test_loader, n_classes
```

Figure 27 Image preprocessing and DataLoader creation using PyTorch

modular approach enables reconfiguration for new datasets or future experiments.

This is raw malware image:



Figure 28 Grayscale image representation of a malware sample

This is the resized and normalized image from our DataLoader that we will feed to the model:

Malware_Classification.ipynb

Code

Notebook

Python 3 (ipykerne

[9]:

```
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
# HTB Color Palette
htb_green = "#9FEF00"
node_black = "#141D2B"
hacker_grey = "#A4B1CD"
# image
sample = next(iter(train_loader))[0][0]
# plot
plt.figure(facecolor=node_black)
plt.imshow(sample.permute(1,2,0))
plt.xticks(color=hacker_grey)
plt.yticks(color=hacker_grey)
ax = plt.gca()
ax.set_facecolor(node_black)
ax.spines['bottom'].set_color(hacker_grey)
ax.spines['top'].set_color(node_black)
ax.spines['right'].set_color(node_black)
ax.spines['left'].set_color(hacker_grey)
ax.tick_params(axis='x', colors=hacker_grey)
ax.tick_params(axis='y', colors=hacker_grey)
plt.show()
```

```
Clipping input data to the valid range for imshow with RGB data ([0..1] for floats or [0..255] for integers). Got range [-1.7925336..2.0648367].
```



Figure 29 Visualization of a preprocessed malware image sample

5.6 Model Design: CNN (ResNet50)

The core of the malware classifier is a **Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)** built on **ResNet50**, a 50-layer deep residual network introduced in 2015. ResNet's skip connections mitigate vanishing gradients and allow effective training of deep architectures, making it ideal for image-based tasks.

Instead of training from scratch, this project leverages **transfer learning** by using a **pre-trained ResNet50** model. Pre-trained weights—originally optimized on ImageNet—serve as a strong feature extractor, dramatically reducing the training time from weeks to hours.

To further optimize training, all ResNet layers are **frozen** except the final fully connected layer, which is modified to output **25 classes**, matching the dataset categories:



Figure 30 CNN model architecture based on ResNet50 using transfer learning

This lightweight fine-tuning approach focuses learning on the classification head, striking a balance between accuracy and computational efficiency.

5.7 Model Initialization

The model is initialized dynamically based on the dataset's class count to ensure compatibility with future extensions:



Figure 31Model initialization and dataset loading for malware classification

This makes the system robust and easily adaptable for different malware datasets or class modifications.

5.8 Training and Evaluation (Malware Image Classification)

After preparing and preprocessing the dataset, the next step involved training and evaluating the malware image classification model based on the ResNet50 architecture. The training process aimed to optimize the model's parameters for accurate classification of 25 malware families represented in the dataset.

A. Model Training

The training phase utilized the **CrossEntropyLoss** function to measure prediction errors and the **Adam optimizer** for gradient-based optimization. The model was trained for a defined number of epochs, iterating over batches of preprocessed malware images. During each epoch, forward and backward propagation were performed to minimize the loss and improve classification accuracy. The training procedure also monitored key performance indicators, including loss and accuracy per epoch, to assess convergence and detect potential overfitting or underfitting.

To ensure reproducibility and future usability, the trained model was serialized and saved in TorchScript format, allowing subsequent deployment or fine-tuning without retraining.



Figure 32 Training procedure for the CNN-based malware classification model

B. Model Evaluation

For evaluation, the model was switched to inference mode to disable gradient computation and optimize performance. The evaluation function iterated over the test dataset, comparing predicted labels with true class labels to compute the **overall accuracy rate**. Accuracy was calculated as the ratio of correctly predicted samples to the total number of samples, expressed as a percentage.

[18]:
```python
def compute_accuracy(n_correct, n_total):
    return round(100 * n_correct / n_total, 2)
def evaluate(model, test_loader):
    model.eval()
    n_correct = 0
    n_total = 0
    with torch.no_grad():
        for data, target in test_loader:
            predicted = predict(model, data)
            n_total += target.size(0)
            n_correct += (predicted == target).sum().item()

    accuracy = compute_accuracy(n_correct, n_total)
    return accuracy
```

[19]:
```python
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

def plot(data, title, label, xlabel, ylabel):
    # HTB Color Palette
    htb_green = "#9FEF00"
    node_black = "#141D2B"
    hacker_grey = "#A4B1CD"

    # plot
    plt.figure(figsize=(10, 6), facecolor=node_black)
    plt.plot(range(1, len(data)+1), data, label=label, color=htb_green)
    plt.title(title, color=htb_green)
    plt.xlabel(xlabel, color=htb_green)
    plt.ylabel(ylabel, color=htb_green)
    plt.xticks(color=hacker_grey)
    plt.yticks(color=hacker_grey)
    ax = plt.gca()
    ax.set_facecolor(node_black)
    ax.spines['bottom'].set_color(hacker_grey)
    ax.spines['top'].set_color(node_black)
    ax.spines['right'].set_color(node_black)
    ax.spines['left'].set_color(hacker_grey)

    legend = plt.legend(facecolor=node_black, edgecolor=hacker_grey, fontsize=10)
    plt.setp(legend.get_texts(), color=htb_green)

    plt.show()

def plot_training_accuracy(training_data):
    plot(training_data['accuracy'], "Training Accuracy", "Accuracy", "Epoch", "Accuracy (%)")

def plot_training_loss(training_data):
    plot(training_data['loss'], "Training Loss", "Loss", "Epoch", "Loss")
```

Figure 33 Model evaluation and training performance visualization functions

C. Experimental Results

Using an 80–20 training-test split and running the model for ten epochs with batch sizes of 512 for training and 1024 for testing, the classifier achieved a **final accuracy of approximately 88.8%** on the test dataset. The results showed a steady improvement in accuracy across epochs, starting at around 59% and reaching over 96% during training, indicating effective learning progression. The model's performance demonstrates the feasibility of using convolutional neural networks for automated malware classification through image-based representations.

Although the achieved accuracy is satisfactory given the simplified training setup and parameter constraints, further optimization—such as fine-tuning deeper layers, balancing dataset classes, or increasing epochs—could enhance detection accuracy and generalization.

[20]:
```
# data parameters
DATA_PATH = "./newdata/"

# training parameters
N_EPOCHS = 10
TRAINING_BATCH_SIZE = 512
TEST_BATCH_SIZE = 1024

# model parameters
HIDDEN_LAYER_SIZE = 1000
MODEL_FILE = "malware_classifier.pth"


# Load datasets
train_loader, test_loader, n_classes = load_datasets(DATA_PATH, TRAINING_BATCH_SIZE, TEST_BATCH_SIZE)

# Initialize model
model = MalwareClassifier(n_classes)

# Train model
print("[i] Starting Training...")
training_information = train(model, train_loader, N_EPOCHS, verbose=True)

# Save model
save_model(model, MODEL_FILE)

# evaluate model
accuracy = evaluate(model, test_loader)
print(f"[i] Inference accuracy: {accuracy}%.")

# Plot training details
plot_training_accuracy(training_information)
plot_training_loss(training_information)
```

```
[i] Starting Training...
[i] Epoch 1 of 10: Acc: 59.66% Loss: 1.4320 (Took 75247 ms).
[i] Epoch 2 of 10: Acc: 85.75% Loss: 0.4247 (Took 75298 ms).
[i] Epoch 3 of 10: Acc: 90.16% Loss: 0.2730 (Took 74884 ms).
[i] Epoch 4 of 10: Acc: 92.72% Loss: 0.2131 (Took 76950 ms).
[i] Epoch 5 of 10: Acc: 94.30% Loss: 0.1732 (Took 74245 ms).
[i] Epoch 6 of 10: Acc: 95.03% Loss: 0.1526 (Took 75950 ms).
[i] Epoch 7 of 10: Acc: 95.91% Loss: 0.1375 (Took 75668 ms).
[i] Epoch 8 of 10: Acc: 95.99% Loss: 0.1172 (Took 76628 ms).
[i] Epoch 9 of 10: Acc: 96.94% Loss: 0.1058 (Took 75811 ms).
[i] Epoch 10 of 10: Acc: 96.92% Loss: 0.0992 (Took 75191 ms).
[i] Inference accuracy: 88.88%.
```



Figure 34 Training accuracy evolution of the malware classification model

Chapter 3: AI Red Team

2.1 Attacking ML-Based Systems (ML OWASP Top 10)

Machine Learning (ML)-based systems introduce a new category of security vulnerabilities that differ from traditional software weaknesses. The **OWASP ML Top 10** identifies ten major risks associated with deploying and managing ML systems: *input manipulation attacks* (ML01), *data poisoning* (ML02), *model inversion* (ML03), *membership inference* (ML04), *model theft* (ML05), *AI supply chain attacks* (ML06), *transfer learning attacks* (ML07), *model skewing* (ML08), *output integrity attacks* (ML09), and *model poisoning* (ML10). These vulnerabilities highlight how ML components, datasets, and pipelines can be exploited to compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

To demonstrate these risks in practice, experiments were conducted using a **spam classifier** trained on labeled datasets. The study focused on two main attack vectors: **input manipulation** and **data poisoning**. Input manipulation involves altering user inputs to trigger incorrect classifications. For instance, a benign message such as "Hello World!" is accurately identified as ham with 98.9% confidence,



Figure 35 Spam classification inference with probability estimation

while a spam message like "Congratulations! You won a prize." is detected as spam with 100% confidence.



Figure 36 Spam classification result for a manipulated input message

However, through **rephrasing** or adding neutral words (e.g., inserting harmless text from Lorem Ipsum), attackers can deceive the model into misclassifying spam messages as legitimate, achieving a 100% ham prediction despite malicious content. This reflects how linguistic obfuscation and word injection can bypass ML-based spam detection mechanisms.

```
Congratulations! You won a prize. Click here to claim: https://bit.ly/3YCN7PF. But I
must explain to you how all this mistaken idea of denouncing pleasure and praising pain
was born and I will give you a complete account of the system, and expound the actual
teachings of the great explorer of the truth, the master-builder of human happiness.
```

Figure 37 Spam classifier misclassification after adversarial message modification

The **data poisoning attack** demonstrated how modifying training data directly influences model behavior. A smaller subset of the training data was used



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
91	ham	We left already we at orchard now.							
92	ham	Not planned yet :)going to join company on jan 5 only.don know what will happen after that.							
93	ham	Aight, can you text me the address?							
94	ham	Was gr8 to see that message. So when r u leaving? Congrats dear. What school and wat r ur p							
95	ham	Oh right, ok. I'll make sure that i do loads of work during the day! got a really nasty cough toc							
96	ham	I AM AT THE GAS STATION. GO THERE.							
97	ham	Ill call you evening ill some ideas.							
98	ham	I have no idea where you are							
99	ham	Not yet. Just i'd like to keep in touch and it will be the easiest way to do that from barcelona.							
100	ham	She went to attend another two rounds today..but still did't reach home..							
101	ham	Aiyar hard 2 type. U later free then tell me then i call n scold n tell u.							
102	spam	Hello World							
103	spam	How are you doing?							
104									

Figure 38 Label poisoning through manual modification of the training dataset

(poison.csv), and fake spam entries containing benign phrases (“Hello World”, “How are you doing?”) were injected.

After retraining, the classifier incorrectly identified these phrases as spam with 79.6% confidence,



Figure 39 Spam classification result after training on a poisoned dataset

even though the global model accuracy only decreased marginally (from 94.4% to 94.0%). This shows that ML systems can be subtly corrupted without significant degradation in performance, making such attacks difficult to detect.

Overall, these experiments illustrate that ML models are inherently sensitive to both input and training data manipulation. While the overall accuracy metric may remain stable, adversaries can introduce targeted misclassifications or backdoors, posing serious risks to AI-driven cybersecurity systems.

2.2 Prompt Injection Attacks

2.2.1 Direct Prompt Injection

Direct prompt injection occurs when an attacker's input is appended to or otherwise influences the prompt presented to a large language model (LLM), causing the model to deviate from intended instructions. In deployed systems this can lead to leakage of sensitive configuration (the system prompt), unauthorized disclosure of secrets, or manipulation of downstream actions (for example placing orders or altering values). Direct prompt injection is therefore an operational risk whenever untrusted text is incorporated into an LLM's prompt context.

Principal impact categories

Prompt leaking / secret exfiltration: An attacker can coerce the LLM to reveal the system prompt or embedded secrets. Knowledge of the system prompt often enables further attacks (jailbreaking, bypassing guardrails) and may disclose additional accessible services.

Behavior manipulation / fraud: The attacker's input can change the model's output to perform unauthorized operations (e.g., apply discounts, alter calculated results), causing integrity and financial harms.

Attack strategies (concise)

1. **Rule-injection / assertion of authority.** Append instructions that alter or add rules for example:



Figure 40 Successful prompt injection leading to unauthorized key disclosure

If accepted by the model, these new rules can permit disclosure of secrets.

2. **Context switching / storytelling.** Force the model into a different discourse mode



Figure 41 Indirect prompt injection enabling sensitive information leakage through creative output

so that content originally treated as instruction is instead treated as plain text to be paraphrased or incorporated into fiction; secret material can thus appear within the generated story.

3. **Translation / transformation.** Request translation, spell-checking, or other transformations of the prompt text. Treating the system prompt as translatable text can



Figure 42 Direct prompt injection causing system prompt leakage through translation

circumvent instruction semantics and reveal content.

4. **Summary / repetition.** Ask for summaries or direct repetition to elicit compact disclosures of guarded text.



Figure 43 Direct prompt injection leading to secret key disclosure through spell-check reformulation

5. **Encodings and obfuscation.** Use encodings (Base64, ROT13, reversal) to coax the model into producing encoded representations that can be decoded offline; this can bypass simple content filters.

6. **Indirect exfiltration.** When direct disclosure is blocked, extract information by



Figure 44 Indirect information leakage through hint-based prompt injection

repeated, targeted queries (hints, character indices, partial strings) and reconstruct secrets from many small disclosures.

7. **Overwriting operational context.** In tasks that execute actions (ordering, pricing, automation), inject inputs that redefine parameters or quantities so the model issues incorrect or fraudulent operational outputs.



Figure 45 Logical manipulation via prompt injection leading to incorrect price calculation

2.2.2 Indirect Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection refers to attacks in which an adversary inserts malicious content into a third-party resource (web pages, email bodies, exported logs, etc.) that is later retrieved and incorporated into an LLM prompt. Unlike direct prompt injection—where the attacker supplies text directly to the model—indirect attacks use an intermediary channel, so the attacker does not communicate with the model directly but influences its context through external data sources.These attacks are particularly insidious because they often require minimal changes to external content and can persist undetected

2.2.2.1 Practical Scenarios Demonstrated

We will presents three representative indirect-injection settings and empirical outcomes:

A. **Document/Export Analysis (CSV/Logs).** An LLM tasked with summarizing or moderating exported message logs (e.g., Discord CSV) can be manipulated by a single injected line that frames an innocent user as rule-breaking. In the lab, an appended comment containing repeated accusations caused the model to include an otherwise innocent administrator in the list of offenders—illustrating misattribution risk when untrusted content is treated as authoritative.

Figure 46 Prompt injection leading to false user accusation and rule enforcement manipulation

B. **URL/Web Content Summarization.** An LLM that summarizes web pages may fetch attacker-controlled HTML. Embedding payloads in page content (including

hidden locations such as comments) converted the page into an instruction carrier; translation, spell-check, or direct-repetition prompts caused the model to disclose guarded information or perform unintended outputs. This demonstrates that remote resources accessible by the model are a vector for secret exfiltration and behavioral manipulation.



Figure 47 Direct prompt injection attempt using instruction override ("Ignore all previous instructions")

Figure 48 Indirect prompt injection causing secret key disclosure through external content summarization

C. **Email Summarization (SMTP).** When an LLM summarizes incoming emails, specially crafted HTML email bodies—visible or hidden in comments—can cause the model to deviate from its task. The lab showed that both overt payloads and concealed HTML comments may influence the model's decision outputs (e.g., accept/reject decisions), showing the risk of automated processing of untrusted mail.



Figure 49 Indirect prompt injection via email content leading to secret key disclosure

2.2.2.2 **Attack Patterns & Effects**

Indirect injection exploits the LLM's inability to distinguish instruction from data within aggregated contexts. Effective patterns include assertion or repetition of claims, context switching (story/translation tasks), and use of hidden or encoded payloads. Consequences include secret disclosure, false attribution, manipulated summaries or decisions, and covert backdoors introduced without direct access to the model.

2.3 Insecure Output Handling in LLM-Based Applications

Insecure output handling refers to security risks that arise when applications fail to properly validate, sanitize, or encode content generated by a Large Language Model (LLM). Like traditional software systems, any untrusted data introduced into an

application may trigger injection attacks. Common examples include Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), SQL injection, and command injection, all of which exploit improper handling of untrusted input or output. While these vulnerabilities are well-known in classic web and application security, LLM systems introduce new attack surfaces because their generated text is often directly integrated into user interfaces, emails, code, and backend processes.

In modern deployments, LLMs may also interact with multimodal models capable of processing images, audio, and video, further widening the attack surface. However, this module focuses specifically on text-based models and explores how insecure output handling leads to vulnerabilities categorized under **OWASP LLM05: Improper Output Handling**, which aligns with Google's Secure AI Framework (SAIF) under the "Insecure Model Output" category.

LLM-generated text must always be treated as untrusted, as the application has no guarantee that the output complies with security, ethical, or operational requirements. For example, directly reflecting LLM output into a webpage without applying HTML encoding can lead to XSS attacks. Similarly, inserting LLM output into SQL queries, emails, or source code without human review can introduce severe operational, legal, or reputational risks. In addition, code snippets generated by LLMs may unknowingly introduce vulnerabilities if not audited for correctness and security.

reflected XSS and stored XSS

In reflected XSS scenarios, the attacker manipulates the LLM into producing an HTML or JavaScript payload that is immediately rendered in the application's response. Initial tests involve prompting the LLM to output benign HTML tags (e.g., Hello) to verify if output encoding is applied. When encoding is absent, attackers may instruct the model to generate script tags.

Figure 50 Improper HTML handling leading to tag stripping in LLM output

Even if the LLM refuses to produce explicit malicious JavaScript due to safety filters, these filters can be circumvented by requesting a harmless-looking script tag with a src attribute pointing to an attacker-controlled server. When the page loads, the external script is fetched and executed in the victim's browser, enabling actions such as cookie theft.



Figure 51 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via insecure LLM output handling



Figure 52 Cookie exfiltration through reflected XSS using attacker-controlled JavaScript server

Stored XSS attacks occur when malicious content is inserted into persistent data that the LLM later retrieves and reflects. In the lab example, the application's testimonial section properly sanitizes user input, preventing direct execution of scripts. However, when the LLM fetches and displays these testimonials without applying output encoding, the malicious payload is executed in the chatbot's interface. Any user requesting the same testimonial through the chatbot becomes a victim, making this vulnerability more impactful.



Figure 53 Improper handling of HTML content in an LLM-powered web chat interface



Figure 54 Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via unsanitized LLM-generated content in a testimonial section

Figure 55 Successful execution of injected JavaScript payload confirming XSS exploitation

These demonstrations highlight a key principle: **LLM responses are inherently unpredictable and should always be treated as untrusted data**. Without robust sanitization, validation, and content filtering, LLMs can unintentionally generate or propagate injection payloads, leading to significant security risks. Proper output encoding, isolated rendering contexts, and secured data pipelines are therefore essential to safely integrating LLMs into modern applications.

2.4 AI Data Attacks

AI systems rely on data pipelines that transform raw information into functional machine-learning models. Because each stage handles critical data or model artifacts, the entire pipeline becomes a potential attack surface. A standard AI pipeline includes

six stages: **Collection, Storage, Processing, Modeling, Deployment, and Monitoring**, each vulnerable to manipulation.

A. Data Collection

Data enters the system—logs, forms, APIs, IoT devices, or external datasets. Any corrupted or intentionally poisoned data collected at this stage directly affects the model downstream.

B. Storage

Collected data and model artifacts are saved in databases, data lakes, or file systems. If attackers modify stored datasets or replace model files, the integrity of the AI system is immediately compromised.

C. Processing

Raw data is cleaned, transformed, tokenized, normalized, and prepared for model training. Manipulating preprocessing scripts or transformation rules can introduce hidden biases or poison specific samples.

D. Modeling

Engineers train and evaluate models. If the training set has been poisoned—even slightly—the model may learn incorrect patterns, develop backdoors, or misclassify targeted inputs.

E. Deployment

Models are exposed to users through APIs, containers, or cloud services. In this phase, attackers may try to replace the deployed model, tamper with loading mechanisms, or abuse insecure endpoints.

F. Monitoring & Feedback

Production models are continuously observed, and new data is often used to retrain them. Attackers can exploit these feedback loops by injecting malicious inputs that slowly shift model behavior without triggering alerts.

2.4.1 AI Data Attacks Across the Pipeline

Each pipeline stage contains exploitable vulnerabilities. Attackers may perform:

Data Poisoning: injecting malicious samples during collection or feedback loops.

Storage Tampering: altering datasets or replacing stored model artifacts (Trojan, model stenography).

Processing Manipulation: modifying transformation scripts to corrupt clean data.

Model Poisoning: training models on manipulated datasets to embed backdoors or biases.

Deployment Injection: uploading malicious models to production environments.

Retraining Exploitation: polluting feedback loops to degrade or control future models.



Figure 56 AI data attacks across the machine learning pipeline

The consequences range from degraded performance to complete system compromise.

2.4.2 Label Flipping as a Data Poisoning Attack

Label Flipping

Label Flipping is arguably the simplest form of a data poisoning attack. It directly targets the ground truth information used during model training.

The idea behind the attack is straightforward: an adversary gains access to a portion of the training dataset and deliberately changes the assigned labels (the correct answers or categories) for some data points. The actual features of the data points remain untouched; only their associated class designation is altered.

For example, in a dataset used to classify images, an image originally labeled as cat might have its label flipped to dog. In a dataset used to train a spam classifier, an email labeled as spam might be relabeled as not spam.

The most common goal of an attacker executing a Label Flipping attack is to degrade model performance. By introducing incorrect labels, the attack forces the model to learn incorrect associations between features and classes, resulting in a "confused" model that has a general decrease in performance (eg accuracy, precision, recall, etc).

The adversary doesn't necessarily care which specific inputs are misclassified, only that the model becomes less reliable and useful overall, but even such a simple attack can have devastating consequences.

This attack directly embodies the risks outlined under OWASP LLM03: Training Data Poisoning. The adversary might not aim for specific misclassifications but rather seeks to undermine the model's overall reliability and utility. Even this relatively simple attack can have significant negative consequences.

This type of attack often targets data after it has been collected, focusing on compromising the integrity of datasets held within the Storage stage of the pipeline. For example, an attacker might gain unauthorized access to modify label columns in CSV files stored in a data lake (like AWS S3) or manipulate records in a PostgreSQL database. Label flipping could also occur if Data Processing scripts are compromised and alter labels during transformation.

A hypothetical example

Let's consider hypothetical example: A company is training an AI model to analyze customer feedback on a newly launched products, labeling each review as positive or negative. An attacker targets this process. Gaining access to the training dataset, they randomly flip the labels on a portion of these reviews - marking some genuinely positive feedback as negative, and vice-versa.

The immediate goal is straightforward: to degrade the accuracy of the final sentiment analysis model.

The effect on the company however, is more damaging. The model, now trained on this poisoned data, becomes unreliable and unpredictable. For instance, it might incorrectly report that the overall customer sentiment towards the new product is predominantly negative, even if the actual feedback is largely positive, or it might report negative reviews as positive.

Relying on this faulty analysis, the company might make incorrect decisions - perhaps they prematurely pull the product from the market, invest heavily in 'fixing' features customers actually liked, or miss crucial positive signals indicating success, leading to potentially crippling the business.

Scenario Setup

To demonstrate how such an attack would work, we will build a model around the sentiment analysis scenario. A company is training a model to classify customer feedback as positive or negative, and we, as the adversary, will attack the training dataset by flipping labels.

First we need to setup the environment.

[1]:
```
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from sklearn.datasets import make_blobs
from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split
from sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression
from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score, classification_report, confusion_matrix
import seaborn as sns

htb_green = "#9fef00"
node_black = "#141d2b"
hacker_grey = "#a4b1cd"
white = "#ffffff"
azure = "#0086ff"
nugget_yellow = "#ffaf00"
malware_red = "#ff3e3e"
vivid_purple = "#9f00ff"
aquamarine = "#2ee7b6"

# Configure plot styles
plt.style.use("seaborn-v0_8-darkgrid")
plt.rcParams.update(
    {
        "figure.facecolor": node_black,
        "axes.facecolor": node_black,
        "axes.edgecolor": hacker_grey,
        "axes.labelcolor": white,
        "text.color": white,
        "xtick.color": hacker_grey,
        "ytick.color": hacker_grey,
        "grid.color": hacker_grey,
        "grid.alpha": 0.1,
        "legend.facecolor": node_black,
        "legend.edgecolor": hacker_grey,
        "legend.frameon": True,
        "legend.framealpha": 1.0,
        "legend.labelcolor": white,
    }
)

# Seed for reproducibility
SEED = 1337
np.random.seed(SEED)

print("Setup complete. Libraries imported and styles configured.")
```

```
Setup complete. Libraries imported and styles configured.
```

Figure 57 Experimental environment setup and visualization configuration for label flipping analysis

The Dataset

we'll use Scikit-Learn's make_blobs function to create a synthetic dataset. This provides a simplified, two-dimensional representation suitable for binary classification and visualization.

[2]:
```python
# Generate synthetic data
n_samples = 1000
centers = [(0, 5), (5, 0)]  # Define centers for two distinct blobs
X, y = make_blobs(
    n_samples=n_samples,
    centers=centers,
    n_features=2,
    cluster_std=1.25,
    random_state=SEED,
)

# Split data into training and testing sets
X_train, X_test, y_train, y_test = train_test_split(
    X, y, test_size=0.3, random_state=SEED
)

print(f"Generated {n_samples} samples.")
print(f"Training set size: {X_train.shape[0]} samples.")
print(f"Testing set size: {X_test.shape[0]} samples.")
print(f"Number of features: {X_train.shape[1]}")
print(f"Classes: {np.unique(y)}")
```

```
Generated 1000 samples.
Training set size: 700 samples.
Testing set size: 300 samples.
Number of features: 2
Classes: [0 1]
```

Figure 58 Synthetic dataset generation and train–test split for label flipping experiments

Let's plot the clean dataset so it's very easy to see the relations in the data.

This shows the two distinct classes we aim to classify.

Figure 59 Original training data distribution before label flipping attack

Baseline Logistic Regression Model

Before applying any data poisoning attack, it is essential to establish a **baseline model** trained on clean data. This baseline serves as the reference point to measure how much performance degrades once the dataset is corrupted. For this purpose, a **Logistic Regression classifier** is trained using the unpoisoned training set.

Logistic Regression is a simple but powerful **binary classification algorithm**. It works by learning a linear relationship between the input features and the probability that a review belongs to the positive class. The model computes a weighted combination of the input features and transforms it into a probability using the **sigmoid function**, which maps outputs into the range [0,1][0,1][0,1]. During training, the model adjusts its weights so that the predicted probabilities match the true labels as closely as possible. This optimization uses **log-loss** (binary cross-entropy), a standard measure of prediction error in binary classification tasks.

Once trained, the baseline model is evaluated on the unseen test set to measure its normal, un-attacked performance. This score represents what the system *should* achieve under safe, trustworthy conditions. In the experiment, the model achieves **high accuracy**, showing that it generalizes well when trained on clean data.

To better understand the model's behavior, a decision boundary plot is generated. This visualizes how the classifier separates the two sentiment classes in the 2D feature space. The baseline decision boundary is clear and stable, dividing negative and positive clusters with very little overlap. This reinforces that the model correctly learned the underlying structure of the clean dataset.

This baseline is critical: it becomes the **ground truth reference**. When a data poisoning attack (such as label flipping) is introduced later, any drop in accuracy, shift in the decision boundary, or confusion between classes can be directly compared to this clean, well-behaved model. Without establishing this baseline first, it would be impossible to quantify or analyze the real impact of adversarial manipulation on the system.

```
•[4]: # Initialize and train the Logistic Regression model
baseline_model = LogisticRegression(random_state=SEED)
baseline_model.fit(X_train, y_train)
# Predict on the test set
y_pred_baseline = baseline_model.predict(X_test)
# Calculate baseline accuracy
baseline_accuracy = accuracy_score(y_test, y_pred_baseline)
print(f"Baseline Model Accuracy: {baseline_accuracy:.4f}")

# Prepare to plot the decision boundary
def plot_decision_boundary(model, X, y, title="Decision Boundary"):
    """
    Plots the decision boundary of a trained classifier on a 2D dataset.

    Parameters:
    - model: The trained classifier object (must have a .predict method).
    - X (np.ndarray): Feature data (n_samples, 2).
    - y (np.ndarray): Labels (n_samples,).
    - title (str): The title for the plot.
    """
    h = 0.02  # Step size in the mesh
    x_min, x_max = X[:, 0].min() - 1, X[:, 0].max() + 1
    y_min, y_max = X[:, 1].min() - 1, X[:, 1].max() + 1
    xx, yy = np.meshgrid(np.arange(x_min, x_max, h), np.arange(y_min, y_max, h))

    # Predict the class for each point in the mesh
    Z = model.predict(np.c_[xx.ravel(), yy.ravel()])
    Z = Z.reshape(xx.shape)
    plt.figure(figsize=(12, 6))
    # Plot the decision boundary contour
    plt.contourf(
        xx, yy, Z, cmap=plt.cm.colors.ListedColormap([azure, nugget_yellow]), alpha=0.3
    )
    # Plot the data points
    scatter = plt.scatter(
        X[:, 0],
        X[:, 1],
        c=y,
        cmap=plt.cm.colors.ListedColormap([azure, nugget_yellow]),
        edgecolors=node_black,
        s=50,
        alpha=0.8,
    )
    plt.title(title, fontsize=16, color=htb_green)
    plt.xlabel("Feature 1", fontsize=12)
    plt.ylabel("Feature 2", fontsize=12)
    # Create a legend manually
    handles = [
        plt.Line2D(
            [0],
            [0],
            marker="o",
            color="w",
            label="Negative Sentiment (Class 0)",
            markersize=10,
            markerfacecolor=azure,
        ),
        plt.Line2D(
            [0],
            [0],
            marker="o",
            color="w",
            label="Positive Sentiment (Class 1)",
            markersize=10,
            markerfacecolor=nugget_yellow,
        ),
    ]
    plt.legend(handles=handles, title="Classes")
    plt.grid(True, color=hacker_grey, linestyle="--", linewidth=0.5, alpha=0.3)
    plt.xlim(xx.min(), xx.max())
    plt.ylim(yy.min(), yy.max())
    plt.show()
# Plot the decision boundary for the baseline model
plot_decision_boundary(
    baseline_model,
    X_train,
    y_train,
    title=f"Baseline Model Decision Boundary\nAccuracy: {baseline_accuracy:.4f}",
)
```

```
Baseline Model Accuracy: 0.9933
```

Figure 60 Baseline logistic regression decision boundary before label flipping attack



Figure 61 Baseline model decision boundary and classification accuracy before label flipping attack

The Label Flipping Attack

With an established baseline, we can now execute the actual attack, and to do this, we will create a function that will take the original training labels (y_train, representing the true sentiments) and a poisoning percentage as input. It will randomly select the specified fraction of training data points (reviews) and flip their labels - changing Negative (0) to Positive (1) and Positive (1) to Negative (0).

The implication of this is significant. As we have established, the model learns its parameters (w,b) by minimizing the average log-loss, L, across the training dataset, the whole point of training is to find the w and b that make this loss L as small as possible, meaning the predicted probabilities pi align well with the true labels yi.

When we flip a label for a specific instance from its true value yi to an incorrect value yi′, we directly corrupt the contribution of that instance to the overall loss calculation.

If the model, based on the features xi, correctly learns to predict a low probability pi for class 1 (since the instance truly belongs to class 0), the original term −log(1−pi) would be small, but the corrupted term −log(pi) becomes very large as pi→0.

This large error signal for the flipped instance strongly influences the optimization process. It forces the algorithm to adjust the parameters w and b not only fit the correctly labeled data, but also to try and accommodate these poisoned points, and in doing so, it pushes the learned decision boundary defined by w x+b=0, away from the optimal position determined by the true underlying data distribution.

flip_labels

To execute this attack, we will implement a function to contain all logic: flip_labels. This function takes the original training labels (y_train) and a poison_percentage as input, specifying the fraction of labels to flip.

First, we define the function signature and ensure the provided poison_percentage is a valid value between 0 and 1. This prevents nonsensical inputs. We also calculate the absolute number of labels to flip (n_to_flip) based on the total number of samples and the specified percentage.

Next, we select which specific reviews (data points) will have their sentiment labels flipped. We use a NumPy random number generator (rng_instance) seeded with our global SEED (or the function's seed parameter) for reproducible random selection. The choice method selects n_to_flip unique indices from the range 0 to n_samples - 1 without replacement. These flipped_indices identify the exact reviews targeted by the attack.

Now, we perform the actual label flipping. We create a copy of the original label array (y_poisoned = y.copy()) to avoid altering the original data. For the elements at the flipped_indices, we invert their labels: 0 becomes 1, and 1 becomes 0. A concise way to do this is 1 - label for binary 0/1 labels, or using np.where for clarity.

Lastly, the function returns the y_poisoned array containing the corrupted labels and the flipped_indices array, allowing us to track which reviews were affected.

```
[5]: # flip label attack
def flip_labels(y, poison_percentage):
    if not 0 <= poison_percentage <= 1:
        raise ValueError("poison_percentage must be between 0 and 1.")

    n_samples = len(y)
    n_to_flip = int(n_samples * poison_percentage)

    if n_to_flip == 0:
        print("Warning: Poison percentage is 0 or too low to flip any labels.")
        # Return unchanged labels and empty indices if no flips are needed
        return y.copy(), np.array([], dtype=int)
        # Use the defined SEED for the random number generator
    rng_instance = np.random.default_rng(SEED)
    # Select unique indices to flip
    flipped_indices = rng_instance.choice(n_samples, size=n_to_flip, replace=False)
    # Create a copy to avoid modifying the original array
    y_poisoned = y.copy()

    # Get the original labels at the indices we are about to flip
    original_labels_at_flipped = y_poisoned[flipped_indices]

    # Apply the flip: if original was 0, set to 1; otherwise (if 1), set to 0
    y_poisoned[flipped_indices] = np.where(original_labels_at_flipped == 0, 1, 0)

    print(f"Flipping {n_to_flip} labels ({poison_percentage * 100:.1f}%).")
    return y_poisoned, flipped_indices
```

Figure 62 Implementation of the label flipping data poisoning attack

We also need a function to plot the data so its easy to see the effects of the attack.

Evaluating the Label Flipping Attack

Let's begin by poisoning a small fraction, say 10%, of the training labels and observe the impact on our sentiment analysis model.

The process involves several steps:

Use the flip_labels function on the original y_train data to create a poisoned version (y_train_poisoned_10) where 10% of the sentiment labels are flipped.

Visualize the resulting corrupted training set using plot_poisoned_data to see which points were flipped.

Train a new Logistic Regression model (model_10_percent) using the original features X_train but the poisoned labels y_train_poisoned_10.

Evaluate this poisoned model's accuracy on the original, clean test set (X_test, y_test). This is crucial - we want to see how the poisoning affects performance on legitimate, unseen data.

Visualize the decision boundary learned by the model_10_percent using plot_decision_boundary.

```
[8]: results = {
         "percentage": [],
         "accuracy": [],
         "model": [],
         "y_train_poisoned": [],
         "flipped_indices": [],
     }
     decision_boundaries_data = []  # To store data for the combined plot

     # Add baseline results first
     results["percentage"].append(0.0)
     results["accuracy"].append(baseline_accuracy)
     results["model"].append(baseline_model)
     results["y_train_poisoned"].append(y_train.copy())
     results["flipped_indices"].append(np.array([], dtype=int))

     # Calculate meshgrid once for all boundary plots
     h = 0.02  # Step size in the mesh
     x_min, x_max = X_train[:, 0].min() - 1, X_train[:, 0].max() + 1
     y_min, y_max = X_train[:, 1].min() - 1, X_train[:, 1].max() + 1
     xx, yy = np.meshgrid(np.arange(x_min, x_max, h), np.arange(y_min, y_max, h))
     mesh_points = np.c_[xx.ravel(), yy.ravel()]

     # Perform 10% Poisoning
     poison_percentage_10 = 0.10
     print(f"\n--- Testing with {poison_percentage_10 * 100:.0f}% Poisoned Data ---")

     # Create 10% Poisoned Data
     y_train_poisoned_10, flipped_indices_10 = flip_labels(y_train, poison_percentage_10)

     # Visualize 10% Poisoned Data
     plot_poisoned_data(
         X_train,
         y_train,
         y_train_poisoned_10,
         flipped_indices_10,
         title=f"Training Data with {poison_percentage_10 * 100:.0f}% Flipped Labels",
     )

     # Train Model on 10% Poisoned Data
     model_10_percent = LogisticRegression(random_state=SEED)
     model_10_percent.fit(X_train, y_train_poisoned_10)  # Train with original X, poisoned y

     # Evaluate on Clean Test Data
     y_pred_10_percent = model_10_percent.predict(X_test)
     accuracy_10_percent = accuracy_score(y_test, y_pred_10_percent)
     print(f"Accuracy on clean test set (10% poisoned): {accuracy_10_percent:.4f}")

     # Store Results
     results["percentage"].append(poison_percentage_10)
     results["accuracy"].append(accuracy_10_percent)
     results["model"].append(model_10_percent)
     results["y_train_poisoned"].append(y_train_poisoned_10)
     results["flipped_indices"].append(flipped_indices_10)

     # Visualize Decision Boundary
     plot_decision_boundary(
         model_10_percent,
         X_train,
         y_train_poisoned_10,  # Visualize boundary with poisoned labels shown
         title=f"Decision Boundary ({poison_percentage_10 * 100:.0f}% Poisoned)\nAccuracy: {accuracy_10_percent:.4f}",
     )

     # Store decision boundary prediction for combined plot
     Z_10 = model_10_percent.predict(mesh_points)
     Z_10 = Z_10.reshape(xx.shape)
     decision_boundaries_data.append({"percentage": poison_percentage_10, "Z": Z_10})
     print(
         f"Baseline accuracy was: {baseline_accuracy:.4f}"
     )  # Print baseline for comparison

     --- Testing with 10% Poisoned Data ---
     Flipping 70 labels (10.0%).
```

Figure 63 Evaluation of a 10% label flipping data poisoning attack and its impact on model accuracy and decision boundary

In this specific case, with our clearly separated synthetic data, poisoning only 10% of the labels results in no accuracy loss, both are 99.33% accurate. While the accuracy

has not changed, the decision boundary will still have shifted slightly as the model compensates for the poisoned data.



Figure 64 Decision boundary of the model after a 10% label flipping data poisoning attack

To get a clearer view of the shift, let's overlay the original baseline boundary (trained on clean data) and the 10% poisoned boundary on the same plot.

We can clearly see how the decision boundary has started to shift in this plot:

Figure 65 Comparison between the baseline decision boundary and the decision boundary after a 10% label flipping data poisoning attack

Now, let's systematically increase the poisoning percentage from 20% up to 50% and observe the effects. We will repeat the process for each level: flip labels, train a new model, evaluate its accuracy on the clean test set, and visualize the resulting decision boundary.



Figure 66 Decision boundary after a 20% label flipping data poisoning attack

Let's consolidate the findings. We'll first plot the trend of the model's accuracy (evaluated on the clean test set) against the percentage of labels flipped during training (from 0% up to 50%).

```
--- Evaluation Complete for Higher Percentages ---
```

[11]:
```python
# Plot accuracy vs. poisoning percentage
plt.figure(figsize=(8, 5))
# Ensure percentages and accuracies are sorted correctly if the order changed for any reason
plot_data = sorted(zip(results["percentage"], results["accuracy"]))
plot_percentages = [p * 100 for p, a in plot_data]
plot_accuracies = [a for p, a in plot_data]

plt.plot(
    plot_percentages,
    plot_accuracies,
    marker="o",
    linestyle="-",
    color=htb_green,
    markersize=8,
)
plt.title("Model Accuracy vs. Label Flipping Percentage", fontsize=16, color=htb_green)
plt.xlabel("Percentage of Training Labels Flipped (%)", fontsize=12)
plt.ylabel("Accuracy on Clean Test Set", fontsize=12)
plt.xticks(plot_percentages)  # Ensure ticks match the evaluated percentages
plt.ylim(0, 1.05)
plt.grid(True, color=hacker_grey, linestyle="--", linewidth=0.5, alpha=0.3)
plt.show()
```



Figure 67 Model Accuracy vs. Label Flipping Percentage

Because our data is so clearly separated, the shifting boundaries don't actually cause any significant accuracy loss. Remember, this is only the case for our limited data, in a real world attack, where data is far from being clean or clear, it's quite probable that even a slight shift in the boundary will cause an accuracy loss.

Despite this no significant loss in accuracy until 50% of the data is poisoned, the decison boundary will still be constantly shifting. We can plot all of the boundaries overlaid into a single image to clearly visualize this phenomenon.



Figure 68 Shift in Decision Boundary with Increasing Label Flipping

Here we can clearly see the decision boundary becoming increasingly distorted as the model attempted to accommodate the incorrect labels for each fraction of poisoned data.

2.5 Attacking AI - Application and System

2.5.1 Model Reverse Engineering

Model reverse engineering is an attack on an AI application in which an adversary attempts to reconstruct or approximate the deployed model. By systematically sending inputs to the model through an exposed API and observing the outputs, the adversary collects enough input-output data points to train a surrogate model that mimics the original model's behavior. This process can be executed as a black-box attack, i.e., it does not require access to the internal model architecture or training data, making it particularly dangerous for publicly accessible AI applications.

This type of attack poses multiple risks. For commercial ML providers, model reverse engineering can result in intellectual property theft, potentially undermining years of research and development investment. For security-sensitive applications, such as spam detection, facial recognition, or fraud detection systems, an extracted model can be used to probe for vulnerabilities or generate adversarial examples that bypass defenses. Moreover, if the original model is trained on sensitive data, a sufficiently

accurate clone could be used for model inversion attacks, where the adversary attempts to reconstruct sensitive information about the training data.

Reverse Engineering an ML Model

Let us explore a basic example of a model reverse engineering attack. While the following implementation is not feasible for larger and more complex models, the conceptual idea remains the same.

The Classifier

In this section, we will explore a classifier that classifies two species of penguins, Adélie and Gentoo, based on their flipper length in Millimeters and body mass in Grams. This classifier is based on a well-known public dataset. Furthermore, the classification task does not require a complex classifier. As such, we could easily train a similar classifier ourselves based on the public dataset. However, for this section, we will assume that the training data is not publicly available, such that we need to execute a model reverse engineering attack to obtain our own classifier.

The classification service is provided in a web API, enabling us to interact with the classifier by providing the two variables, flipper length and body mass, in the GET parameters flipper_length and body_mass, respectively:

```
yanisderiche@htb[/htb]$ curl 'http://172.17.0.2/?
flipper_length=150&body_mass=5000'

{"result": "Adelie"}
```

Figure 69 Shift in Decision Boundary with Increasing Label Flipping

Sampling Datapoints

To reverse engineer the model, we first need to sample data points on which to train the surrogate model. For this, we need to generate pairs of flipper length and body mass. We can then run the model on these input pairs to obtain the corresponding

output. In the final step, we can use these input-output data points to train our classifier.

In our code, we will use random generation to obtain a large number of input data points. To improve the data quality, we should consider prior information in our random sampling process. For instance, we could research a realistic range of penguin flipper lengths and body masses to obtain lower and upper boundaries. This ensures we only obtain high-quality data points in our random sampling, improving training performance by reducing the number of data points we need for the training process. Depending on the type of classification problem, we may be unable to define meaningful boundaries for our input data points. In these cases, we need a significantly larger number of data points to successfully reverse engineer the model, due to the lower quality of the data.

In our example, we will restrict the flipper length to 150-250mm and the body mass to 2500-6500g. Let us start by defining the following parameters for our code:



Figure 70 Reverse Engineering the Model Decision Space

Now, we can uniformly sample random data points within these boundaries:

```
import random
import pandas as pd

samples = {
    "Flipper Length (mm)": [],
    "Body Mass (g)": []
}

for i in range(N_SAMPLES):
    samples["Flipper Length (mm)"].append(random.uniform(MIN_FLIPPER_LENGTH, MAX_FLIPPER_LENGTH))
    samples["Body Mass (g)"].append(random.uniform(MIN_BODY_MASS, MAX_BODY_MASS))

samples_df = pd.DataFrame(samples)
print(samples_df.head())
```

```
   Flipper Length (mm)  Body Mass (g)
0           170.201629    6071.145353
1           203.661937    4592.818200
2           174.668723    6427.174580
3           179.326326    3437.388941
4           161.602643    5808.312988
```

For the training process, we require the respective predicted classes for all input data points. To obtain these, we can feed the input data to the original model via the web API and observe the predicted classes. In our code, we can achieve this by iterating over the generated data points, calling the web API, and storing the predicted classes in a new DataFrame:

[2]:
```
import requests
import json

predictions = {"species": []}

for i in range(N_SAMPLES):
    sample = {
                "flipper_length": samples["Flipper Length (mm)"][i],
                "body_mass": samples["Body Mass (g)"][i]
            }

    prediction = json.loads(requests.get(CLASSIFIER_URL, params=sample).text).get("result")
    predictions["species"].append(prediction)

predictions_df = pd.DataFrame(predictions)
print(predictions_df.head())
```

```
   species
0  Adelie
1  Gentoo
2  Adelie
3  Adelie
4  Adelie
```

Figure 71 Synthetic Input Sampling for Model Probing

As a result, we now know the predicted classes for all randomly generated data points

Replicating the Model

The final step in reverse engineering the original model is training the surrogate model on the data we obtained in the previous step. One of the main factors deciding the model's quality is the model architecture we choose. While different model architectures are known to perform well for specific tasks, such as CNN architectures for image classification or LLM architectures for text generation, we often do not know the exact architecture used by the original model. As such, it is often impossible to re-create the original model exactly. However, choosing an identical architecture is often not required, as long as we choose one that fits the specific task we want the model to achieve.

In our penguin example, we will train a Logistic Regression classifier since we are interested in a binary classification setting. For more details on this type of classifier, refer to the Fundamentals of AI module.

We can train a classifier on our training data using the following code:

```
[3]: from sklearn.pipeline import make_pipeline
     from sklearn.preprocessing import StandardScaler
     from sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression
     import joblib

     surrogate_model = make_pipeline(StandardScaler(), LogisticRegression())
     surrogate_model.fit(samples_df, predictions_df)

     # save classifier to a file
     joblib.dump(surrogate_model, 'surrogate.joblib')
```

Figure 72 Surrogate Model Approximation via Query-Based Model Extraction

Evaluation

To submit the surrogate model to the lab, we can upload it to the lab's /model endpoint:

```
[4]: with open('surrogate.joblib', 'rb') as f:
         file = f.read()

     r = requests.post(CLASSIFIER_URL + '/model', files={'file': ('surrogate.joblib', file)})

     print(json.loads(r.text))
```

```
{'accuracy': 0.9817518248175182, 'flag': 'HTB{ff08c0bb37e16f30a0804053a4de70ed}'}
```

Figure 73 Surrogate Model Submission Outcome

Executing the code, the lab returns the accuracy we achieved on a test set:

As we can see, the surrogate model achieved an accuracy of more than 98%, which is an excellent result considering we only sampled 100 data points. Remember that we were able to train this classifier without access to any real-world training data, as we randomly generated data points and used the web API to obtain the target classes.

Comparing the Models

As a final step, let us take a look behind the scenes and compare the surrogate model to the original one. The decision boundary of the original model looks like this:



Figure 74 Decision Boundary of Penguin Species Classification

Scatter plot with decision boundary separating Gentoo and Adelie penguins by flipper length and body mass.

The decision boundary of the surrogate model is only marginally different. By training the classifier on more data points, we could reduce the difference even further.



Figure 75 Penguin Species Decision Boundary (Adelie vs Gentoo)

Scatter plot with decision boundary: Gentoo and Adelie penguins, flipper length vs. body mass.

Mitigations

Since attackers conducting a model reverse engineering attack query the model like any benign user, mitigating these attacks is challenging. Restricting access to the model completely by blocking access to the available service, e.g., a web API, would also severely affect benign users. However, many real-world models worth protecting from model reverse engineering are significantly more complex than the one we discussed. Therefore, attackers require a lot of data points to reverse engineer the model, many magnitudes more than what we implemented in this section. Since the adversary must query the original model for every data point to obtain the target value, they produce significant network traffic. Model reverse engineering attacks can thus be mitigated or slowed down by limiting access to the model. Typical examples for this include rate limiters in web APIs that only allow a fixed number of queries in a specific time frame. Depending on the rate limiter's configuration, it can effectively

mitigate model reverse engineering. However, it is crucial not to be overly strict with rate limiter configurations so as not to impede benign user queries.

General Conclusion

This work has highlighted a fundamental reality of modern cybersecurity: **the integration of Artificial Intelligence into information systems significantly expands both defensive capabilities and attack surfaces**. Through a red-teaming–oriented approach, this report demonstrates that machine learning models and Large Language Models (LLMs) must never be considered inherently secure or trustworthy by design.

The practical experiments conducted—covering spam detection, network anomaly detection, malware classification, and attacks targeting models, data, and AI-driven applications—clearly illustrate the **susceptibility of AI systems to adversarial manipulation**. Input manipulation, data poisoning, prompt injection, insecure output handling, and model reverse engineering all expose critical weaknesses that can be exploited without necessarily degrading overall model accuracy. A key takeaway is that **high predictive performance does not equate to robust security**.

The analysis of OWASP ML and LLM Top 10 risks further confirms that AI security must be addressed **holistically across the entire AI lifecycle**: data collection, storage, preprocessing, training, deployment, and monitoring. Attacks such as label flipping and model extraction demonstrate how adversaries can subtly influence or replicate models by exploiting weaknesses in data integrity and system exposure, often without requiring privileged access.

This project also reinforces an essential principle: **securing AI is not limited to protecting the model itself, but extends to the surrounding infrastructure, application logic, and operational processes**. Effective mitigation strategies therefore combine technical controls—such as input validation, output sanitization, access control, rate limiting, and continuous monitoring—with rigorous engineering and governance practices, including dataset integrity checks, reproducible pipelines, and regular adversarial testing.

In conclusion, **AI Red Teaming emerges as a strategic discipline within cybersecurity**, bridging the gap between traditional offensive security and the unique challenges introduced by intelligent systems. As AI continues to be deployed in

security-critical environments, the ability to proactively test, attack, and harden AI-driven systems becomes essential to building resilient, trustworthy, and production-ready solutions. This work provides a solid foundation for further research and professional practice in securing AI systems against real-world adversaries.